VICTOR-IONUŢ RUSU

IS PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS NECESSARY FOR MINDREADING?

Introduction

Is phenomenal consciousness necessary for mindreading?. Debates if phenomenal consciousness is necessary for mindreading. Examines LLMs and philosophical zombies, analyzing Simulation Theory and Theory-Theory to determine the role of subjective experience.

Abstract

I will argue that if subjective experience is a prerequisite for mindreading, then Large Language Models and philosophical zombies either have different ways of mindreading or they cannot partake in understanding others. I will explore how this impacts recent debates on Large Language Models (LLMs). At first I will explore the consequences following from the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is not required for mindreading, conceived as solely based on behaviour interpretability. I will analyze two candidates for ToM: Simulation Theory and Theory-Theory. I argue the latter would allow for philosophical zombies and LLMs to both exhibit Theory of Mind. Simulation Theory relies on introspection, simulation and imagination. Simulation entails replicability. For LLMs and philosophical zombies alike, subjective experience seems, at least prima facie, to be missing. So the replicated mental state would have to be incomplete; I end by debating whether phenomenal aspects of the simulated mental state are necessary for attribution.

Review

The paper addresses a highly pertinent and fascinating question at the intersection of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence: "Is Phenomenal Consciousness Necessary for Mindreading?" The abstract immediately establishes the stakes by positing a critical dilemma: if subjective experience *is* indeed a prerequisite for understanding others, then Large Language Models (LLMs) and philosophical zombies either engage in fundamentally different forms of mindreading or are inherently incapable of it. This premise sets up a timely and intellectually stimulating exploration, directly engaging with contemporary debates surrounding the capabilities and limitations of advanced AI systems. The proposed methodology appears robust, commencing with an exploration of the consequences should phenomenal consciousness *not* be a requirement for mindreading, framing it solely on behavior interpretability. The author wisely chooses to analyze two dominant candidates for Theory of Mind (ToM)—Simulation Theory and Theory-Theory—which provides a solid theoretical framework for the discussion. The abstract effectively highlights a key tension: while Theory-Theory might readily accommodate LLMs and philosophical zombies exhibiting ToM, Simulation Theory, with its reliance on introspection, simulation, and imagination, presents a more significant challenge. The central argument hinges on the apparent absence of subjective experience in LLMs and zombies, leading to a critical examination of whether the replicated mental states in a simulation would be "incomplete" without phenomenal aspects, and if these aspects are, in turn, necessary for effective mental state attribution. This paper promises to make a significant contribution to ongoing discussions about the nature of consciousness, the mechanisms of mindreading, and the philosophical implications of advanced AI. The final question posed in the abstract—whether phenomenal aspects of simulated mental states are necessary for attribution—is particularly incisive and forms the crux of the paper's potential impact. For the arguments to fully cohere, the paper will need to provide exceptionally clear and rigorous definitions of "mindreading," "subjective experience," and "phenomenal consciousness," especially when dissecting their proposed roles within each ToM framework. Should the author successfully navigate these complex conceptual terrains, this work could offer crucial insights into the fundamental capacities we attribute to both human and artificial intelligences, challenging our assumptions about what it means to "understand" another mind.

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