Azzahra Vinka Priatna, Annisha Rahmadhila Adha Tasman, Rouli Anita Velentina

Mekanisme Akuntabilitas Sovereign Wealth Fund: Perbandingan antara BPI Danantara dan GPFG Norwegia

Introduction

Mekanisme akuntabilitas sovereign wealth fund: perbandingan antara bpi danantara dan gpfg norwegia. Bandingkan akuntabilitas Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) BPI Danantara (Indonesia) dan GPFG (Norwegia). Analisis pengawasan, tanggung jawab manajerial, dan risiko korupsi untuk transparansi.

Abstract

The accountability mechanism in Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) is a crucial aspect in ensuring transparency and sustainability in the management of state investment funds. This mechanism is reflected in the implementation of oversight and managerial responsibility within SWFs. BPI Danantara, as Indonesia’s SWF, operates under an internal oversight system involving a Board of Supervisors, an audit committee, and external monitoring from public auditors and relevant state institutions in a decentralized manner. In terms of managerial responsibility, the Business Judgment Rule (BJR) is applied, providing legal protection for managers in investment decision-making, as long as it is conducted in good faith and without negligence. However, this mechanism still poses a significant risk of corruption due to Indonesia’s low Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score. Meanwhile, Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) has a stricter oversight structure, with a hierarchical reporting system from Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) to the Ministry of Finance and direct supervision by the Norwegian Parliament. Although GPFG does not apply BJR, it has consistently achieved the highest transparency scores and enjoys stronger public trust in its governance. This study aims to analyze the differences in supervisory regulations and managerial accountability between these two institutions.

Review

This paper addresses a highly pertinent and critical topic: the accountability mechanisms within Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), using a comparative analysis between Indonesia's BPI Danantara and Norway's Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). The abstract effectively highlights the distinct approaches to oversight and managerial responsibility in these two significant state investment vehicles. It immediately draws attention to the contrast between BPI Danantara's decentralized internal and external monitoring, coupled with the application of the Business Judgment Rule (BJR) and the associated corruption risks, against GPFG's robust, hierarchical oversight structure that, despite not utilizing BJR, consistently achieves high transparency and public trust. The comparative framework chosen is particularly insightful, juxtaposing an emerging market SWF with a well-established and highly regarded developed economy counterpart. This allows for a rich discussion on how different regulatory environments, institutional capacities, and national contexts (such as varying Corruption Perceptions Index scores) influence the design and effectiveness of accountability frameworks. The abstract's focus on specific mechanisms like BJR, board structures, audit committees, and parliamentary oversight provides a solid foundation for analyzing the practical implications of these design choices. The paper's stated aim to analyze differences in supervisory regulations and managerial accountability offers valuable contributions to the literature on SWF governance, especially for countries seeking to enhance the integrity and sustainability of their state investment funds. While the abstract provides a compelling overview, a full treatment of this subject would benefit from a deeper exploration of several areas. For instance, beyond merely identifying the application of BJR in Indonesia and its absence in Norway, a more detailed analysis of the *practical consequences* and *efficacy* of these differing legal protections in real-world investment scenarios would strengthen the argument. Furthermore, considering Indonesia's lower CPI, the paper could extend its recommendations by identifying specific, actionable policy adaptations for BPI Danantara, potentially exploring hybrid models or alternative mechanisms that address local challenges while aspiring towards GPFG's high standards. Examining the socio-political and cultural underpinnings that enable GPFG's high public trust, beyond just its regulatory structure, would also add a valuable dimension to the comparative insights.

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