JAMES CARGILE

EPIMENIDES

Introduction

Epimenides. Explore the Epimenides paradox and related logical puzzles. This analysis argues that these paradoxes stem from mistaken assumptions about sentence meaning, offering a new resolution.

Abstract

This presents the Epimenides and some related paradoxes with a brief history. It is then argued that the paradoxes arise from mistaken assumptions about what the relevant problem sentences say. For example, one paradox has the sentence A: “The sentence A is not true” and two premises: (i) that a sentence is true iff what it says is true and (ii) what the sentence A says is that the sentence A is not true. Premise (ii) is false. A similar mistake about what is said is involved in the Epimenides. Paradoxes involving other “propositional attitudes” such as belief, require different treatment, but the proper interpretation of the words involved is, again, the primary requirement for relief.

Review

This abstract presents a concise yet intriguing approach to resolving the Epimenides paradox and related self-referential puzzles. The central thesis posits that these logical difficulties arise not from inherent contradictions within truth or reference, but from mistaken assumptions about what the problematic sentences genuinely express. The author promises a brief historical overview, setting the stage for a critical re-evaluation of the semantic content of these paradoxical statements. The core of the argument is illustrated through a specific example: the sentence A: "The sentence A is not true." The abstract asserts that the standard derivation of paradox relies on two premises, and crucially, that the second premise – "what the sentence A says is that the sentence A is not true" – is false. This analytical move directly challenges a deeply ingrained intuitive understanding of self-referential statements. The author then claims a similar misinterpretation underlies the Epimenides paradox itself, and further acknowledges that paradoxes involving other propositional attitudes, such as belief, would require distinct, albeit still interpretation-focused, treatments. While the abstract offers a provocative strategy, its brevity leaves several critical questions unanswered. The primary challenge is to articulate precisely what these problematic sentences *do* say if the intuitive interpretations are deemed false. Simply asserting a premise is incorrect without offering a compelling alternative account of the sentence's meaning risks relocating the problem rather than solving it. A full paper would need to provide a robust theoretical framework for this "proper interpretation," demonstrating its consistency and explanatory power across a range of paradoxes, rather than relying on a general assertion of "similar mistake." Such detailed explication is essential for moving beyond a mere denial of the standard understanding towards a truly novel and convincing resolution.

Full Text

Comments

You need to be logged in to post a comment.