Hassan Jafaritabar

Derecho animal de sentido común

Introduction

Derecho animal de sentido común . El derecho animal desde el sentido común humano y la sensibilidad animal. Explora la protección diferenciada (perros, primates vs. insectos) y propone minimizar el dolor con mecanismos no contenciosos.

Abstract

Los derechos de los animales se presentan aquí no meramente como cuestiones científicas o filosóficas, sino como asuntos de sentido común humano que responden a la sensibilidad de los animales. Esta perspectiva se alcanza mediante una abducción de sentido común, más que por deducción o inducción. En consecuencia, el derecho tiende a proteger en mayor medida a los perros, los primates y aquellos animales cuyo sufrimiento es vívidamente percibido por los seres humanos, mientras que la situación jurídica de los insectos sigue siendo frágil. El sentido común responde con mayor facilidad a los animales que poseen lo que este artículo denomina un alma vívida. Esta presencia es más intensa allí donde los animales se enfrentan a los humanos a través de un rostro y unos ojos capaces de sostener la mirada humana. Así, el alma se concibe como un fenómeno difuso en una escala gradual. Desde este punto de vista, la función adecuada del derecho no es maximizar el bienestar, sino minimizar el dolor que los humanos imponen. Dado que los animales no pueden litigar, este artículo sugiere que sus derechos se hagan valer mediante mecanismos no contenciosos, permitiendo a los tribunales actuar sin recurrir al litigio adversarial tradicional.

Review

The article "Derecho animal de sentido común" offers a refreshingly pragmatic and accessible reorientation of the animal rights discourse. Moving beyond purely scientific or philosophical justifications, the paper asserts that animal rights are fundamentally matters of human common sense, rooted in our innate sensitivity to animal suffering. This distinctive perspective is reached through an "abduction of common sense," a methodological choice that sets it apart from traditional deductive or inductive approaches in legal scholarship. A core contribution is the introduction of the "vivid soul" concept, which aims to explain the differential legal protection afforded to various species based on perceived sentience and the ability to engage with human perception, particularly through a sustained gaze. One of the article's significant strengths lies in its ability to compellingly articulate the existing disparities in animal law. The "vivid soul" concept effectively explains why animals like dogs and primates typically receive stronger legal safeguards than, for instance, insects; their suffering is more "vividly perceived" by humans, often through the empathetic connection fostered by a "face and eyes capable of sustaining the human gaze." This offers a powerful, descriptive understanding of the emotional and perceptual foundations of legal protection. Furthermore, the paper's reframing of law's primary function—not to maximize welfare but to minimize the pain human actions impose—is a crucial and actionable insight. The innovative suggestion for non-adversarial mechanisms to assert animal rights also provides a valuable practical pathway, circumventing the inherent complexities of traditional litigation where animals cannot directly participate. While the "abduction of common sense" provides an intriguing lens, a deeper epistemological exploration of this methodology would strengthen the argument, particularly regarding how common sense itself can be critically examined to avoid reinforcing anthropocentric biases. The "vivid soul" concept, while descriptively powerful, risks being circular; it explains *why* some animals are protected more but offers less on *how* to challenge this inherent hierarchy or extend robust protection to species that do not fit this immediate human-perceived connection. Future research could further elaborate on how this gradual scale of "soul" translates into concrete, equitable legal frameworks, especially for animals that do not possess a "face and eyes" in the human sense but demonstrably experience suffering. Despite these points for further development, the article presents a highly original and thought-provoking perspective on animal rights, prompting a valuable reconsideration of their origins, scope, and enforcement in a way that is both intellectually engaging and practically oriented.

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