Ágoston Korom

Setting the Limits of the Member States’ Institutional Autonomy in the Case of Romania, Hungary, and Poland

Introduction

Setting the limits of the member states’ institutional autonomy in the case of romania, hungary, and poland . Examine the CJEU's evolving role in limiting Member States' institutional autonomy regarding national courts in Romania, Hungary, and Poland, analyzing key decisions and precedents.

Abstract

Until recent years, the measures taken for EU law implementation in domestic legal systems did not address the institutional issues of national courts, namely the institutional autonomy of Member States in the context of domestic judicial systems. The application of EU law in domestic law is based on two principles: institutional and procedural autonomy. In the interpretation of procedural autonomy, EU law is to be enforced by applying national procedural rules, subject to the limits of effectiveness and the principles of equal treatment. The principle of equal treatment requires that the procedural rule of a Member State for the enforcement of EU law should not be less favourable than the procedural rule of a Member State for the enforcement of claims arising under national law in a comparable situation. The principle of effectiveness requires that national procedural rules should not make it impossible or excessively difficult to enforce rights deriving from EU law. The institutional autonomy meant that the enforcement of EU law took place within the framework of the Member States’ institutions: they were not bound by EU law, except in very specific areas or criteria. Before the change under our examination occurred, the Court of Justice of the European Union defined specific criteria for the establishment of national courts, but these were not aimed at ensuring the independence of domestic courts. Instead, they were limited to the cases in which the CJEU found questions referred for the preliminary ruling admissible; these criteria guaranteed, inter alia, that the given court is established by law, operates permanently, applies the law, and renders binding decisions. In recent decades, a change occurred in the case law of the CJEU, and while issues regarding the judicial system remain under the Member States’ competence, EU law defines several criteria in that regard. In this paper, we will examine the decisions taken in the three Member States under review, Hungary, Romania and Poland, but we will also look at the background: the limitation of institutional autonomy by the practice of the CJEU was not ‘without precedent’, i.e. this case law started to be applied in other Member States already in the first half of the 2010s. Following an examination of the decisions concerning the three Member States, an attempt is made to compare the EU criteria set out in those decisions in relation to the national courts with each other and with the decisions examined in the precedents. An analysis will also be made of whether the EU requirements for courts can be systematised on the basis of the current decisions.

Review

This paper proposes a timely and critical examination of the evolving relationship between the European Union and its Member States concerning the institutional autonomy of national judiciaries. The abstract clearly outlines the historical context, moving from an era where EU law implementation primarily relied on the principles of procedural and institutional autonomy, to a more recent period marked by the Court of Justice of the European Union's (CJEU) increasing engagement with the institutional structures of national courts. By focusing on the specific cases of Romania, Hungary, and Poland, the research promises to illuminate how the CJEU has begun to set limits on national institutional design, even in areas traditionally considered within Member States' sole competence. The methodology outlined suggests a comprehensive approach, beginning with an examination of specific CJEU decisions pertaining to the three chosen Member States. Crucially, the paper also intends to look at the "background" of this shift, acknowledging that the limitation of institutional autonomy was not without precedent and had roots in earlier CJEU case law from the 2010s. This contextualization is vital for understanding the trajectory of the Court's jurisprudence. A key strength appears to be the intention to compare the EU criteria across these decisions and precedents, with an aim to systematize the EU requirements for national courts, thus moving beyond case-specific observations to a broader analytical framework. Overall, this research addresses a highly pertinent and politically charged topic at the heart of the European Union's rule of law framework. The exploration of how the principles of effectiveness and equal treatment, traditionally applied to procedural autonomy, have influenced the understanding of institutional autonomy is particularly compelling. By analyzing the nuanced interplay between national judicial independence and EU legal requirements in specific and contentious cases, the paper has the potential to offer significant insights into the dynamic constitutional landscape of the EU, providing valuable contributions to both academic discourse and policy debates surrounding judicial independence and the limits of national sovereignty.

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